Introduction
There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.
1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents,
claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth. 2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se.
First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se.
Belief Content Determines De Se Belief
I hope to understand the notion of de se belief in a way that is neutral with respect to whether there is anything distinctive or philosophically special about the phenomenon of de se belief. Let us say that a subject has a de se belief just in case she sincerely expresses, or is disposed to sincerely express, her belief using a first-person pronoun. The beliefs that I would express with the utterance "I am hungry" or "My pants are on fire" are paradigm 1 See, for example, Lewis (1979) and Chisholm (1981) . 2 See, for example, Magidor (forthcoming) and Cappelen and Dever (2013) .
examples of de se beliefs. 3 Even the de se skeptic, one who denies that there is anything special, distinctive, or uniquely problematic about de se attitudes will accept the existence of de se beliefs so characterized; she will just go on to maintain that there is nothing distinctive or uniquely problematic about such beliefs. Such beliefs, the skeptic maintains, can be explained in terms of contents that are not different from contents that characterize other kinds of beliefs that we express without using a first-person pronoun.
The thesis I wish to argue for is the following:
Content Determines De Se Belief (CDDS):
Necessarily, for any subjects, S and T, if S and T agree with respect to the content of their beliefs, then they have the same de se beliefs.
The motto associated with the above determination thesis is "No difference in de se belief without a difference in content". "De se belief", as it appears in CDDS, is to be understood in the minimal and neutral sense described in the previous paragraph. Also, I take the above formulation to be neutral with respect to a number of views concerning the nature of belief contents. First, I take it to be neutral with respect to what contents are: i.e. sets of possible worlds, structured propositions, or sentences in a language of thought. Also, it does not presuppose that there is a unique content associated with each belief. It may be that there are a number of contents that characterize a given de se belief. For one who takes sets of possible worlds to fully characterize the content of belief, the above thesis can be understood as claiming that there is no difference in de se belief between subjects S and T without a difference between the set of worlds that characterize S's beliefs and the set of worlds that characterize T's beliefs. For one who takes structured propositions to fully characterize the content of belief, the above thesis can be understood as claiming that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in the structured propositions that each subject believes.
3 By appealing to sincere expressions and dispositions to express sentences containing first-person pronouns, I don't intend to give strict necessary and sufficient conditions for the notion of de se belief that I am characterizing. It is well-known that dispositional analyses of belief are subject to counterexample. Hopefully, the appeal to sincere expressions of, and dispositions to express, sentences containing first-person pronouns succeeds in highlighting a class of beliefs that is both intuitive and theoretically neutral.
CDDS makes use of the notion of same de se belief. What is it for a subject to have the same de se belief as another subject? What is it for them to have different de se beliefs?
Let us say, roughly, that subject S has the same de se belief as subject T just in case S and T both have de se beliefs and S is disposed to express this belief using a sentence with the same Kaplanian character as the sentence that T is disposed to assert in expressing her My argument for CDDS can be summarized as follows: (1) Suppose we have two subjects with different de se beliefs. (2) Then they will act differently or be disposed to act differently. (3) Appeal to difference in content is essential to explain the difference in action or disposition to act differently. (4) Therefore there is a difference in content between the two subjects. So difference in de se belief entails a difference in content.
Regarding (1), I've explained above what it is for two subjects to have different de se beliefs. As I've defined it, all parties to the debate can grant the existence of de se beliefs, so construed, and grant the existence of cases where two subjects have different de se beliefs.
Why accept statement (2): that two subjects with different de se beliefs will act differently or be disposed to act differently? To a large extent, this follows from what it is for the two subjects to have different de se beliefs. In the simplest case, one subject will utter, or be disposed to produce an utterance of, a sentence of the form "I am F" and the other will utter, or be disposed to produce an utterance of, a sentence of the form "I am not F".
Producing or being disposed to produce different sentence-types is in itself a difference in action or difference in disposition to act. It seems plausible that producing utterances of different sentence-types involves performing actions of different action-types. Of course, there may be additional differences in action in light of the difference in de se belief. If one has a de se belief that he would express by saying "My pants are on fire" and the other has a different de se belief, one that she would express by saying "My pants are not on fire" the difference in their respective actions will presumably not be limited to a difference in speech acts.
Statement (3) of the argument, that appeal to difference in content is essential to explain the difference in action or disposition to act differently, is the one that requires the most defense and much of the remainder of the paper will be arguing for it.
In order to evaluate the argument it will be helpful to focus on an example involving two subjects with different de se beliefs. Let us consider a case in which David's pants catch fire and Susan, who is standing nearby, sees it happen. Suppose David forms a belief that he expresses by saying "My pants are on fire" and Susan, upon observing David and hearing his utterance, forms a belief that she expresses by saying "Your pants are on fire". Also suppose that Susan is not disposed to produce an utterance of "My pants are on fire". As I've defined it, David and Susan fail to have the same de se beliefs: David expresses his belief by producing an utterance of "My pants are on fire" but Susan is not disposed to produce this utterance. In the case described, it seems clear that the differences in actions between
Susan and David will go well beyond merely producing different utterances. David will stop, drop, and roll, and Susan will run to get the fire extinguisher. What explains the difference in action? If CDDS is violated in this case, and the content of Susan's belief is the same as the content of David's belief, then there must be some other relevant difference that explains the difference in action between the subjects. What I will argue for in the next three sections of the paper is that there are no plausible candidates for the explanation of the difference in action other than differences in content between the agents.
Difference in Available Action
In order to reject statement (3), one must argue that appeal to content is not essential in explaining the difference in action between two subjects with different de se beliefs.
Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever argue exactly this in chapter 3 of their 2013 book The Inessential Indexical. They consider cases similar to the one described above involving David and Susan and they claim that such cases fail to motivate positing a difference in content between the subjects. Although Cappelen and Dever don't explicitly state their claim in these terms, I think this follows from claims that they do explicitly make. They argue that explanations of actions need not involve an indexical or first-personal element. Considering cases like the one involving David and Susan, they say "it is not necessary for an indexical element to enter into the rationalization" (p.37). They claim that an adequate explanation of difference in action can be given that is "entirely third-person" (p.37). As we will see, the third-person beliefs and desires that enter into the explanation of differences in action between two subjects are believed and desired by both subjects. So differences in action can be explained without positing differences in belief content. Cappelen and Dever agree that there is some relevant difference that explains the difference in action between David and Susan; they just deny that it is a difference at the level of content. (3): that appeal to difference in content is essential to explain the difference in action or disposition to act differently.
Difference in Perspective
Unlike Cappelen and Dever, Robert Stalnaker acknowledges that there is a special problem associated with self-locating or de se attitudes. 6 However he rejects the determination thesis that I am arguing for: that de se beliefs are determined by belief content; that there is no difference in de se beliefs without a difference in belief content. In footnote 4 of his "Modeling a Perspective on the World" he states, "The main point I will be arguing for is more controversial: the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that there is a distinctive kind of self-locating content." 7 In this paper, Stalnaker considers a case in which Albert is in the kitchen and Boris is in the basement and there is no self-locating ignorance: both know where they themselves are and where the other is. Later he writes:
5 See Ninan (2016, p.105-107) for a different response to Cappelen and Dever's account. Ninan's response offers an equally successful strategy for defending my argument for CDDS against the challenge posed by Cappelen and Dever's account. 6 Stalnaker (2016, p.122, fn.4) . 7 Stalnaker (2016, p.2, fn. 4), his emphasis.
But being self-locating…is not a feature of a proposition believed. Even in cases, such as the case of Boris and Albert, where there is no self-locating ignorance, and so Boris's self-locating beliefs are exactly the singular propositions about himself that he believes, those same propositions are also believed by Albert, but they are not selflocating for him (Stalnaker 2016, p.133 Weber (2014) gives to this account and Stalnaker's reply to it. Weber argues against "the proposal to treat self-location as a feature of the believer's relation to the content of the belief, rather than as a feature of the content itself" (Stalnaker 2016, p.133, fn. 21) . 9 Weber claims that it is a defining theoretical role of content to reflect differences in cognitive significance. And the beliefs of Boris and Albert have different 8 Although Stalnaker explicitly denies the thesis that content determines de se belief: Albert and Boris can be alike with respect to the content of their beliefs yet have different de se attitudes, it is difficult to see how to reconcile these claims with the details of Stalnaker's account. In several papers, Stalnaker construes a doxastic accessibility relation as a relation obtaining between the (centered) base world and a set of centered words: "The centers of the centered-worlds in second term of the relation represent the person that person takes herself to be in a world that is compatible with the way she takes the world to be, and the time in that world that she takes it to be" (Stalnaker 2016, p.132) . But this suggests that the belief set modelling Boris's belief will differ from the belief set modelling Albert's belief. After all, Boris takes himself to be in the basement and so the worlds in his belief set will be centered on an individual in the basement, and Albert takes himself to be in the kitchen and so the worlds in his belief set will be centered on an individual in the kitchen. But curiously Stalnaker does not take this centered representation to comprise the content of Boris's and Albert's respective beliefs. If he did, then Albert and Boris would have different belief contents merely in virtue of Albert believing he is in the kitchen and Boris believing he is in the basement. If these centered worlds representations are part of the content of belief and Boris and Albert differ with respect to what centered worlds comprise their belief sets, then Stalnaker's view is straight-forwardly compatible with CDDS. But this seems to conflict with Stalnaker's claim at the outset of his 2016 paper "The main point I will be arguing for is more controversial: that the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that there is a distinctive kind of selflocating content" (Stalnaker 2016, p.122, fn.4) . I think the way of reconciling this conflict is by recognizing that the finer-grained, centered worlds comprising the belief set do not correspond to the content of belief. Stalnaker does not think that centered worlds are necessary for characterizing the content of belief once we recognize the link that such contents bear to the (centered) base world. In Chapter 4 of Context Stalnaker writes "it is not necessary to use more fine-grained contents [i.e. centered worlds] once we have added the structure to represent the links between a subject's situation and the possible worlds that represent his cognitive state in that situation" (Stalnaker 2014, p.113, my italics) .
So I take Stalnaker's view to be that belief contents are given in terms of possible worlds, not centered worlds, and belief contents do not fully determine the de se beliefs of a subject. Rather whether a given belief is self-locating for a subject depends on the link between the subject's situation (represented in terms of the base world) and "the possible worlds that represent his cognitive state in that situation".If this interpretation of Stalnaker's view is wrong and, in fact, belief content is characterized in terms of centered worlds and centered worlds determine whether a subject's beliefs are self-locating, then Stalnaker's account poses no threat to, and in fact vindicates, CDDS. 9 This way of construing Stalnaker's view is supported by a number of claims that Stalnaker makes such as when he writes "In general, two questions need to [be] distinguished: (1) what is the content of belief? (2) what is the nature of the relation between the believer and the content that constitutes its being the content of his or her belief? I think one should locate the essential indexical element in the answer to the second question" (Stalnaker 1999, p. 21). cognitive significance. Therefore, this difference in cognitive significance ought to be reflected in a difference in content. Stalnaker responds to this argument as follows:
Weber has an argument against the proposal to treat self-location as a feature of the believer's relation to the content of the belief, rather than as a feature of the content itself. It begins with the following thesis, with which I agree, at least on one way of interpreting it: "It is the defining theoretical role of content to reflect differences in cognitive significance. Beliefs that represent things differently should be assigned different contents." (Weber 2014, 18) It is then argued that since it make a difference to the cognitive significance of a thought that it is self-locating, this feature must be built into the content. But I take the thesis that is the premise of this argument to concern the comparison of the cognitive significance of two beliefs of the same person at the same time. It implies that if O'Leary believes that O'Leary was born in California, but not that he himself was, then we must distinguish the content of the belief from the content of what he does not believe -that he himself was born in California. That is, the thesis implies that we should not explain the difference as a case where the same proposition is believed in one way, but not in another. But the thesis does not imply that the content of Boris's belief that he himself is in the basement must be distinguished from the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement. These are not beliefs that have a different cognitive significance for some one believer" (p.133, fn.21)
We can state the thesis that Stalnaker accepts in the above passage as follows:
(CS1) Necessarily, if S believes b1 at time t and the cognitive significance of S believing b1 at t differs from the cognitive significance of S believing b2 at t, then b1 and b2 have different contents.
And we can state the thesis that he rejects in the above passage as follows:
(CS2) Necessarily, if S believes b1 at time t1, T believes b2 at t2 and S's believing b1 at t1 differs in cognitive significance from T's believing b2 at t2, then b1 and b2 have different contents.
Stalnaker's endorsement of (CS1) and rejection of (CS2) is consistent with his idea that belief states, not belief contents, explain action and cognitive significance. In cases where the belief contents are the same, differences in action or cognitive significance can be explained by the fact that a different belief state is involved, where the difference in belief state results from a difference in base world rather than difference in belief content. In cases in which the antecedent of (CS1) is true, a single base world is involved and so differences in cognitive significance must be explained in terms of difference in belief content. In cases where the antecedent of (CS2) is true, it may be the case that different belief states are involved in virtue of differences in base worlds and so the consequent need not hold.
The first difficulty I see with Stalnaker's account is that it is unclear how it is able to distinguish between the case where Boris believes de se at 2pm that he is in the basement and the case in which he merely believes at 2pm that Boris is in the basement without having the corresponding de se belief. As we've seen, de se belief on Stalnaker's account involves appeal to two ingredients: a base world and a belief content. But we can consider a case in which Boris at 2pm believes that he himself is in the basement and a case in which Boris at 2pm believes that Boris is in the basement without believing de se that he is in the basement. In both cases the subject is the same and the time of believing is the same. So these features (namely the base world) cannot be appealed to in order to explain the difference in cognitive significance. The only option seems to be to explain the difference in terms of a difference in belief content. But, as we've seen, Stalnaker claims that "the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that there is a distinctive kind of self-locating content" (Stalnaker 2016, p.112, fn. 4) . When it comes to the difference between Boris's belief at 2pm that he himself is in the basement and Boris's third-person belief at 2pm that Boris is in the basement, the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does imply that there is a distinctive kind of self-locating content. If the difference is captured at the level of content in such a case, then the question arises why this difference in content doesn't also explain the difference between Boris's belief that he himself is in the basement and Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement. This leads to the second difficulty.
The second difficulty arises when we consider Boris's de se belief that he himself is in the basement and Albert's non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement. Let us suppose that at 2pm 1. Boris believes that he himself is in the basement.
Let us call the content of Boris's de se belief 'C1'. Stalnaker maintains that Albert can believe the same propositions that Boris believes without thereby having a self-locating belief. In the above-quoted passage Stalnaker rejects Weber's argument for the claim that "the content of Boris's belief that he himself is in the basement must be distinguished from the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement" (p.133, fn.21). This supports the following two premises: 2. Albert believes C1 and believes that Boris is in the basement.
3. Albert believes C1 and does not believe that he himself is in the basement. Given that the case described does not involve any confusion over who is who and no one is ignorant of anyone's location, the following premise is also true.
Boris also believes that Boris is in the basement.
Let us call the content of this belief of Boris's 'C2'. Since Boris's belief at 2pm that he himself is in the basement differs in cognitive significance from Boris's belief that Boris is in the basement (Boris could believe that Boris is in the basement without believing that he is Boris and that he is in the basement and, so, fail to unload the washing machine), it follows from (CS1), the principle that Stalnaker endorses, that:
5. The content of C1 differs from the content of C2.
But we've already noted that the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement is the same as the content of Boris's belief that he himself is in the basement, namely C1. So: 6. Therefore, the content of Boris's belief that Boris is in the basement is not the same as the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement.
What Boris believes when Boris believes that Boris is in the basement is not the same as
what Albert believes when he believes that Boris is in the basement. This conclusion strikes me as one that Stalnaker would find unwelcome. Part of the motivation for his account is that it allows for a simple, straight-forward account of what it is for two subjects to have the same belief, yet his view seems to commit him to maintaining that Boris and Albert believe different things when they believe that Boris is in the basement. Alternatively, if we grant that the content of Boris's belief that Boris is in the basement is the same as the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement, then we must deny that the content of Albert's belief that Boris is in the basement is the same as the content of Boris's belief that he himself is in the basement.
Stalnaker's acceptance of CS1 and rejection of CS2 strikes me as an unstable and unattractive position. First, it seems to grant that when it comes to beliefs of the same person at the same time, de se belief is a matter of the content believed. What then motivates denying this dependence of de se belief on content when it comes to different subjects or different times? Furthermore, Stalnaker's acceptance of CS1 and rejection of CS2 seem at odds with the very motivations that lead him to claim that Boris's de se belief that he himself is the basement has the same content as Albert's non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement. Stalnaker's motivation for locating the de se-ness in the relation rather than the content is to allow for "agreement and disagreement between believers, and the communication of belief" (Stalnaker 1999, p.20) . But this motivation seems to be undermined when we consider Boris's non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement and Albert's non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement. I don't see how these beliefs can have the same content given that Stalnaker accepts CS1 and claims that Albert's non-de se belief has the same content as Boris's de se belief. I conclude that Stalnaker's attempt at denying that de se belief is determined by the content of belief is unsuccessful. 
Perry, Belief States, and Content
Another sort of account that seems to deny CDDS is John Perry's account of de se belief.
What I will argue in this section is that the sense in which Perry's view appears to reject CDDS is merely terminological and, in the way in which I think the notion of content ought to be understood, Perry's account is in fact in accordance with the thesis. 10 Given that the second difficulty I raise for Stalnaker's account arises from accepting CS1 and rejecting CS2, would the account avoid difficulty by adopting a uniform approach to the relation between cognitive significance and belief content by accepting both CS1 and CS2? Such an account grants the central premise of Weber's argument for the conclusion that what makes a belief self-locating is a feature of its content, and would end up vindicating CDDS rather than providing an alternative to it. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
The view that Perry defends in his landmark 1979 paper "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" involves distinguishing between the content of a belief and the belief state in which the content is believed.
11 Considering the pants-on-fire example above, suppose that David first sees a reflection of himself in the mirror without realizing that it is him and comes to believe of the man in the mirror that his pants are on fire without believing that his own pants are on fire. When David later realizes that his own pants are on fire, Perry maintains that the content of his belief is the same as the content of his belief when he believes of the man in the mirror that his pants are on fire: in both cases it is the singular proposition that David's pants are on fire. However Perry claims that the content is However I think it would be a mistake to take Perry's account as at odds with CDDS, at least as I intended it. Perry's belief states ought to be understood as having content and so David and Susan differ with respect to their belief contents in virtue of being in different belief states. At the very least, belief states ought to be understood as having content in the sense that I am interested in when formulating the determination thesis. The fact that Perry reserves the term 'content' for the singular proposition believed by the subject is a mere choice in terminology, and belief states ought to be understood as having content because they play the same theoretical roles that contentful states play in other theories. Below I provide three reasons why I think it is correct to maintain that belief states have content.
First, belief states can be classified by abstract objects in the way that content is classified on other accounts. Perry claims that belief states can be classified according to sentence-types containing indexicals, however one could also classify belief states according to properties, functions, or sets of centered worlds. 12 The belief state that David is in when he comes to believe that his own pants are on fire may be taken to be the property of wearing pants that are on fire, or a function from individuals to truth-values (returning true for all and only those individuals whose pants are on fire), or a set of worlds centered on all and only those whose pants are on fire. The fact that there is a natural way of assigning abstract objects to belief states, as in other accounts of belief content, suggests that belief states have content.
A second reason why belief states have content is because they account for similarities and differences in belief between different subjects in the way that other accounts of content do. 13 If I believe that I am the tallest person in the room and you believe that you are the tallest person in the room, there is a straightforward sense in which we believe something similar: there is a sense in which what I believe is the same as what you believe. This similarity in belief is captured, not by the distinct singular proposition that each of us believes, but rather by the fact that we are both in the same belief state.
Similarly, there is a straightforward sense in which David and Susan believe different things 12 Lewis (1979) interprets Perry's view as claiming that belief has two contents: a singular proposition and a function from individuals to singular propositions. See Lewis (1979, p.536-537 what is different about two subjects' beliefs and, in these cases, that role is satisfied by the belief states of the subject.
Thirdly, belief states have content because, like other accounts of content, they are representational. One way to see this is by recognizing that some belief states are better at representing a subject's predicament than others. If David's pants are on fire, then if David accesses the singular proposition that David's pants are on fire through the belief state that is classified by the sentence-type "My pants are on fire" he does a better job representing his actual predicament than if he accesses the same singular proposition through the belief state classified by the sentence type "Your pants are on fire". These better and worse ways in which David can represent his actual predicament are not captured by the singular proposition he believes, which is true in both cases. Perhaps it is questionable whether belief states can be properly described as being true or false. However, there is a clear sense in which they represent a subject's predicament and some belief states do a better job at this than others. This suggests that belief states are themselves representational and so satisfy another functional role of belief content.
Perry's belief states play all the same theoretical roles that content plays on other accounts, and so, I think it is appropriate to conclude that they have content. In addition to having global truth-values (i.e. being true (or false) at all points of evaluation within a world), I will also assume that globally portable propositions are sharable. If a subject, s1, in w believes globally portable proposition, p, then it is possible in the relevant sense, for any subject, s2, in w to also believe p. It is possible in the relevant sense for another person to believe p if they are capable of believing it assuming they have the necessary concepts, the requisite mental abilities, and perhaps necessary experiences.
14 To claim that a proposition is sharable is to deny that accessibility to the proposition is limited in the sense described by Perry (1979, p.15-16) . The globally portable proposition that bananas contain potassium is sharable in that, not only do I believe it, but anyone else can also believe it (assuming they have the necessary concepts, mental abilities, and so forth). is presented to no-one else" (Frege 1918, p.132) . A view that claims that David believes a demonstrative proposition that only he has access to, such as the thinker of this very thought has pants that are on fire, would likewise deny that the relevant content is portable. 18 On one way of filling in the details, Perry's (1979) account also involves denying portability. If we take belief content to consist of ordered pairs of singular propositions and belief states classified by sentences containing indexicals, then de se content is not portable.
David's belief that his pants are on fire involves David having the belief content <David's pants are on fire, "My pants are on fire"> and no one else is able to believe this content.
19
Adopting the latter way, denying globality, involves positing content that differs in truth-value from one individual to the next. One way of doing this is to take de se content to be properties rather than traditional propositions as proposed by Lewis (1979) and Chisholm (1981) . 20 For David to believe that his pants are on fire is for David to believe (or selfascribe) the property wearing pants that are on fire. This is a property that is had by David but not by Susan. We can take properties to be true at individuals just in case the individual has the property ascribed. Susan's belief involves believing a different property such as the property of being perceptually acquainted with someone whose pants are on fire. A centered worlds approach to de se thought similarly denies that de se content has global truth-values. 21 If the content of David's de se belief is the set of worlds centered on an individual whose pants are on fire, this content is true at those individuals who have flaming pants and false at those who don't. So, centered worlds content is not true at all locations within the world.
Conclusion
In this paper I have characterized an account of de se belief that is intended to be neutral with respect to the view that there is a special kind of de se content. I then argued in favor of a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content. According to the determination thesis, there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argued that various proposals that reject this determination thesis face insurmountable difficulties. In the last section I use the determination thesis to argue for a type of content that is deserving of the name 'de se content'. I also show how de se content may differ in kind from non-de se content: in virtue of either being non-portable or in virtue of not having global truth-values. I take these considerations to vindicate the view that there is indeed a special kind of content that is not globally portable and is essential to explaining differences in action.
22 22 Thanks to Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Dirk Kindermann, an anonymous referee for this journal, and the audience of the 3 rd Workshop on Semantic Content and Conversational Dynamics at the University of Barcelona, July 2015 for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
